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Abstract
The Danish and Dutch pension systems are often referred to as “among the best in the 
world”. In this paper we compare pension systems and pension products in Denmark 
and the Netherlands. We focus on the shifts that are taking place in both countries, 
from pension products with relatively low levels of risk for pension scheme members 
to pension products with more risk but also higher expected return. We also present 
the results of a case study where customers were given the chance to shift from a 
low-risk to a higher-risk product. We end out drawing lessons that are relevant for 
discussions in many countries.
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Samenvatting
Transitie naar variabele pensioenproducten in ’s werelds beste pensioenstelsels:
Een vergelijkingsstudie tussen Nederland en Denemarken
We vergelijken de Deense en Nederlandse pensioenstelsels en pensioenproducten. 
Hierbij richten we ons op de overgang van pensioenproducten met relatief weinig 
risico voor de deelnemers naar pensioenproducten met meer risico en dus ook een 
hogere verwachte uitkering. We bekijken de recente Nederlandse wetswijziging 
waardoor het mogelijk is, binnen premieregelingen, voor meer risico en rendement 
te kiezen via variabele uitkeringen. In Denemarken heeft in het afgelopen decennium 
een overgang plaatsgevonden van uitkeringen met een minimale rendementsgarantie 
naar producten zonder garantie. De opgedane ervaring leert ons dat het verstandig 
is om eerst regelgeving vast te stellen alvorens de overgang te laten plaatsvinden. 
Tevens presenteren we de resultaten van een casus waarbij deelnemers de keuze werd 
gegeven om over te schakelen van een product met laag risico naar een met hoog 
risico. Dit toont aan dat mannen met weinig pensioenvermogen en lage garanties die 
in steden wonen, bereid zijn om die garanties op te geven voor grotere kansen. Zodra 
de garanties zijn opgegeven, is het vanuit communicatief oogpunt aan te bevelen om 
de deelnemers niet alleen te informeren over de verwachte hogere pensioenuitkering 
maar ook over de toename in onzekerheid. Gegeven dat beide onderzochte stelsels 
hoog aangeschreven staan, kunnen deze bevindingen ook relevant zijn voor andere 
landen dan Denemarken en Nederland. 
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1. Introduction
The Dutch and Danish pension systems are frequently referred to as “the best in the 
world” (Mercer, 2017). This is due to the amount of pension savings in Denmark and 
the Netherlands, the corporate governance of pension providers, the robustness of 
pension systems, and more. Measured in relation to GDP, private pension savings in 
the Netherlands and Denmark are the highest in the world. However, in spite of the 
size of pension savings, the Danish and Dutch pension systems also face challenges. 
These challenges are due in particular to the current low-interest-rate environment 
coupled with increasing life expectancy. Low interest rates and longer life expectan-
cies make it challenging for pension providers to honor pension promises (or even 
guarantees). As a consequence, the Dutch and Danish pension sectors have under-
gone and continue to undergo considerable changes. 
 In the Netherlands, most private pensions are Defined Benefit (DB) plans.1 
Although the percentage of fully Defined Contribution (DC) plans in the Netherlands 
is low, DC-plan design is actively discussed in the Netherlands within the context of 
broad pension system reform.2  In addition, a new law was implemented in 2016 that 
allows for risk-taking in DC plans through investment in risky assets as opposed to 
strictly risk-free exposure. Therefore, risk exposure is now possible not only during the 
accumulation but also the decumulation phase, in the hope of harvesting risk pre-
miums. These are called variable, i.e. risky, annuities. Previously, pension wealth at 
retirement had to be converted into a fixed annuity that would no longer be exposed 
to risky financial markets. In Denmark, contrary to the Netherlands, most private 
pensions are DC plans. Typically, pensions savings were in guaranteed products, i.e. 
the capital in the DC account, both in the accumulation and the decumulation phase, 
was guaranteed to increase by a certain minimum return. During the past decade, 
however, Danish pension holders have shifted from guaranteed pension savings to 
non-guaranteed savings. The main driving forces behind this shift have been the 
increased capital requirements under Solvency II plus the fundamental idea that 
allowing for more risk will lead to higher returns. 
1 As we discuss further in the paper, the current pension system in the Netherlands does not 
consist of DB plans in its strict sense, but rather of a combination of DB and DC.
2 The Dutch government coalition has stated that the Personal Pensions with Risk-sharing PPR 
with collective buffers as described in Bovenberg and Nijman (2017b) will be the core of the 
new legislation. This product shares many characteristics with DC plans. See also Bovenberg and 
Nijman (2017a, 2017b) for the recently developed design of the total reform.
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 When interest rates are low, pension guarantees induce pension providers to 
invest mainly in safe assets so as to be able to fulfill guarantees in DC schemes and to 
honor promised benefits in DB schemes. Safe investments ensure that pensions are 
paid out, but since the returns from these investments are low, pensions will be low 
as well. In non-guaranteed pension schemes and variable annuities, pension pro-
viders can invest more in risky assets and harvest the related risk premium, thereby 
generating higher expected returns. This is obviously at the cost of pensions becoming 
more risky. 
 As a result of these developments we see a process starting in the Netherlands 
that allows pension holders to shift from relatively safe products to risky products, or 
at least one in which the risks are made explicit, both in the sense of identifying the 
risk-bearer (employee versus employer) as well as the increased potential for extra 
returns. In Denmark this process was started some years ago. These fundamental 
changes call for a comparison of the two systems. Perhaps the Netherlands can ben-
efit from what the Danish transition has taught. On the other hand, Dutch pension 
projections have been surrounded by confidence bounds, something that has not 
been the case in Denmark. Could Denmark learn something from the Netherlands 
here? The scope of this paper is to compare Danish and Dutch pension systems, focus-
ing on the shift from safe to more risky products that takes place in the two countries. 
The insights on how to structure risk taking or guarantees in the pay-out phase of DC 
plans, which are summarized in this paper, are likely to be relevant for the current 
Dutch pension reform debate. Given the well-developed nature of pension systems 
in Denmark and the Netherlands, these learnings should also be relevant for other 
countries that are thinking about how to design their pension systems. 
 In order to understand the situation of both the individual, who needs to decide 
which pension product to invest in, and the regulatory viewpoint on how pension 
system transition has taken and still takes place, we first describe the general pension 
sectors and the design of the products in the Netherlands and Denmark. We find that 
at macro level, the Dutch and Danish pension systems have many similarities. For 
instance, both countries have large pension sectors, they both face higher life expec-
tancy, and their old-age dependency ratios are expected to increase. 
 The main part of this paper focuses on pension products. We see some import-
ant differences between Denmark and the Netherlands in this regard. As already 
mentioned, the most important difference between the Dutch and Danish pension 
sectors is the widespread use of DB plans in the Netherlands, while these are almost 
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non-existent in Denmark.3 Another interesting dimension is that different pension 
savings dimensions seem to be discussed in the two countries. In the Netherlands, 
the new legislation focuses on risks in the decumulation phase in DC plans, although 
the current discussion implies a total reform resulting in a shift from “DB” to DC. In 
Denmark, the discussion focuses on risks in the accumulation phase, i.e. there was 
and will continue to be a DC framework, but return guarantees are altered. In DB 
plans, the issue is about how the benefits are formed, and thus the uncertainty that 
surrounds these. In DC plans, the issue is about the return that the contributions can 
generate. 
 In addition to comparing the pension products and the related discussions in 
the Netherlands and Denmark, we analyze a case study where pension holders were 
allowed to switch from a guaranteed to a non-guaranteed product. The case involves 
a medium-sized Danish pension fund that gave its pension holders the opportunity 
to make such a switch in 2007. We found that in particular younger men living in 
Copenhagen, the capital and largest city in Denmark, with a pension product with a 
low guaranteed return and relatively low pension wealth were more likely to switch. 
These findings tell us which pension holder category is more likely to switch to a 
product involving higher risk, and thus possibly a higher expected return, when given 
the chance to do so. 
 We wish to note that, when this paper speaks of “risky pension products”, it is 
implicitly understood as referring to risks for the customer. A shift from a guaranteed 
to a non-guaranteed product typically lowers the risk of insolvency of the pension 
provider, but as a consequence it increases the risk for the customer with respect to 
returns from pension savings. It is the latter effect that we refer to when discussing 
“increases in risk”.
1.1 International transition to variable annuities
Transitions similar to those in Denmark and the Netherlands, from guarantees or 
DB plans to non-guarantees in the form of variable annuities, are taking place in a 
number of countries. In this section, we briefly discuss several recent developments in 
national pension reforms that have motivated our analysis. 
 In Switzerland, interest rate guarantees go back as far as 1985. The minimum 
return guaranteed has decreased from 4% to 1.25% in the last several decades. In 
Belgium, the average guaranteed rate of 3.5% has been transformed into variable 
3 The Dutch DB can be regarded as a collective DC plan in which employers bear less risk than in 
a purely DB plan. The guarantee of the DB part is weak as the promise can be adjusted 
depending on the financial situation. 
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rates that are tied to current yields, this in order to increase the sustainability of 
the Belgium pension system (Devolder and De Valeriola, 2017). Bovenberg (2012) has 
compared the Dutch and Danish pension systems in general. Our own focus is more 
specifically on the move from safe, guaranteed products to risky, unguaranteed 
products in the Netherlands and Denmark. The Dutch variable annuity is described in 
the paper of Balter and Werker (2017). Jørgensen and Linnemann (2012) have described 
three variable pension products, for which they compared both the accumulation and 
decumulation phases, and explained in detail the interest rate guarantee, the most 
common pension product in Denmark. Bruhn and Steffensen (2013) derived for which 
type of preferences the Danish interest rate guarantee is the optimal product design. 
 In Latin America (Pennacchi, 1999), relative rate-of-return guarantees became 
common since the major transform from a DB to a DC system in the late 1980s. Garcia 
Huitron and Rodriguez-Montemayor (2017) discussed the debate for a reform of the 
current DC setting to more target-based investments. Variable annuities are still 
uncommon in Latin America, although variable annuities in combination with a 
minimal pension guarantee have been allowed in Chile since 2004 (Rocha et al., 2011). 
Japan followed the evolution in the US concerning the guarantees embedded in the 
variable annuity, since the financial deregulation in 1999 (Zhang, 2006). Also in China, 
variable annuities have regained interest since 2008. This caused Chinese policymak-
ers to proceed with the development of regulations for these products. See Matterson 
(2017) for more information on retirement in the Asian market. 
 In the US, fund-linked annuities were introduced in the 1970s, and in the 1990s 
a wide variety of guarantees were added to these variable annuities. The recent 
financial crisis caused solvency issues for some providers (Forsyth and Vetzal, 2014). In 
combination with inefficient hedging strategies, these losses were largely due to the 
high option values. The most common guarantees embedded in variable annuities 
in the US are guaranteed minimum death benefits (GMDB) and guaranteed minimum 
living benefits (GMLB), where the latter can be subdivided into guaranteed minimum 
accumulation benefits (GMAB), guaranteed minimum income benefits (GMIB), and 
guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits (GMWB). Bauer, Kling and Russ (2008) 
constructed a universal framework to price these guarantees. 
 Japan, Canada and the Netherlands only had 4.2%, 4.6% and 5.8% respectively 
in DC assets in 2016 (see Global Pension Assets Study 2017, Willis Towers Watson). In 
Canada, regulations on annuities within DB plans and regulations on the conversion 
to a larger reform have been developed lately (Warshawsky, 2013). The enhanced 
Canadian Pension Plan is being implemented as of now. 
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 In Sweden, DC plans have covered the vast majority of pension schemes since 
2007 (after 12 years of negotiation), similar to the current situation in Denmark. At 
retirement, pension holders can choose between converting the pension into a 
fixed annuity (to avoid investment risk) or a variable annuity. The variable annuity 
reflects the same mechanism as the Dutch product described in this paper, implying 
that the customer can opt for an annuity in which the fund continues to hold risky 
investments. These annuities do not have a guaranteed value (OECD, 2015). Individual 
pension accounts were introduced gradually starting in the late 1990s, and, similar 
to the Danish case, individuals were able to choose a fund. Engström and Westerberg 
(2003) and Palme et al. (2007) investigated the decision-making process and found 
that individuals with higher education and higher income, who are married and 
under 42 years, were more likely to make an active choice (Palmer, 2004). In Sweden, 
85% chose the variable annuity, reflecting both variable financial returns and mortal-
ity rates, rather than the fixed annuity. Rivera-Rozo (2009) described the presence of 
variable annuities in Australia, Chile, Sweden, the UK, and the US up to 2009. Rusconi 
(2008) also described several national annuity markets. Of all individuals participating 
in the total Australian annuity market in 2000, who did not take their pension wealth 
out as a lump sum, 71% chose variable annuities without protection against longevity 
risk, 20% chose for  variable annuities with a fixed horizon, and 9% went for variable 
annuities with protection against mortality risk. Allocated annuities without protec-
tion increased to almost 100% of the market from the late 1990s to 2012, while the 
relation between lump sums and annuities went from almost 80% to an equal split 
(Asher et al., 2013). Variable annuities were introduced in the UK in 2006, including 
additional minimum growth rate guarantees on the payout. These additional guaran-
tees put providers under pressure during the recent crisis. 
 In many countries, low interest rates and low mortality rates have thus put many 
large pension systems under pressure, leading to discussion and reform. Variable 
annuities, i.e. non-guaranteed unit-linked products and DC-style plans, seem to be 
popular following the recent crisis. In this paper, we compare the changes in Denmark 
and the Netherlands in more detail, and we draw lessons regarding communication 
about risk and return, rules and regulations, and supervision. These lessons apply 
to many other countries since the Danish and Dutch  pension systems, which are 
regarded as among the best in the world, reflect two “extremes” in that the former 
involves an almost strictly DC setting while the latter reflects a more DB-like setting. 
In addition, in Denmark the transition to non-guaranteed products took place some 
time before the change in the Dutch DC plans. Moreover, no consensus on a broader 
reform has been found yet in the Netherlands. 
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 We have structured our paper as follows. In Section 2, we describe the pillars of 
the Dutch and Danish pension systems. In Section 3, we discuss and describe the 
introduction of variable annuities in the Netherlands. This is followed in Section 4 
by a description of the transition from guaranteed to non-guaranteed pensions in 
Denmark, including an analysis of which pension holders switch from guaranteed 
to non-guaranteed pensions. In Section 5 we discuss the learnings. Conclusions are 
contained in the final section.
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2. Pension savings and pension systems in the Netherlands and Denmark
The pension systems of both the Netherlands and Denmark consist of three pillars, 
as shown in Table 1. In the Netherlands, the first pillar accounted at the end of 2013 
for 54% of pension entitlements, while the second pillar accounted for 40% and the 
third pillar for 6% (Bruil et al., 2015). 
 The first pillar provides a pension irrespective of the individual’s working history. 
The right to a full state pension is conditioned on the requirement that the individual 
must have lived or worked for at least 50 years in the Netherlands. In Denmark, the 
full right to the state pension is obtained after 40 years of residence. This “full right” 
in Denmark is the right to a basic amount plus a means-tested supplement. The 
Dutch old-age pension (AOW) is not means-tested and is based on the PAYGO (pay as 
you go) system. In the Netherlands as well as in Denmark, state pension contributions 
depend on income levels through tax payments, but these contributions are not 
added to an individual account.4 
 The second pillar consists of work-related pension plans. This pillar is funded by 
both employees and employers. In both the Netherlands and Denmark, about one 
third of the contribution is paid by the employee and two third by the employer. In 
the Netherlands, the pension premium with respect to the second pillar is about 20% 
of gross pensionable income minus the state pension offset, implying a contribution 
of about 10% of gross income. In Denmark, the premium depends on whether a 
person is publicly or privately employed, although the contribution rate is generally 
higher for public employees; private employees started contributing later than public 
4 In Denmark, the first pillar also includes a compulsory funded DC scheme, called ATP. This cov-
ers basically all wage earners. The contribution rates are relatively small, and therefore this 
scheme cannot in itself ensure a sufficiently high supplement to the publicly funded pensions. 
We therefore leave it out of the overview in Table 1.
Table 1. Overview of pillars in the Dutch and Danish pension systems.
Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3
State Pension Scheme Occupational Pension Schemes Private Benefit Plans
The Netherlands
Old Age Pension Defined Benefit Defined Contribution
Defined Contribution
Denmark
Old Age Pension Defined Contribution Defined Contribution
Civil Service Pension  
(Defined Benefit)
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employees. Neither in Denmark nor in the Netherlands is the pension premium 
allowed to depend on age or gender. This is known as a uniform contribution system. 
Pension premiums are tax deductible, and no tax is paid on a person’s pension 
wealth. However, pension payouts are subject to tax. Moreover, government and 
employers facilitate a large second pillar through mandatory agreements for many 
industries. Therefore, the participation level is very high. More than 90% of employ-
ees in both countries belong to a pension fund.  
 The third pillar consists of voluntary individual pension plans. These are tax-effec-
tive compared to savings products that are not retirement-related. To be tax-effective, 
pensions have to be lifelong in the Netherlands5. In Denmark one can decide to take 
out a part of pension savings as a lump sum and use the remainder to finance a life-
long annuity.
2.1 Defined Benefits and Defined Contributions
One motivation for this specific paper is the introduction in the Netherlands of the 
Premium Schemes (Improvement) Act (Wet verbeterde premieregeling). This applies to 
the defined contribution (DC) plans in the second and third pillars. Since only 5.8% of 
Dutch entitlements involved a defined contribution, while 94.2% constituted defined 
benefits (see Global Pension Assets Study 2017 by Willis Towers Watson), the new law 
applies directly to only a small fraction of the pension plans. However, a transition 
is going on towards more DC plans in the Netherlands. In addition, relaxation of 
guarantees is currently being discussed for the DB plans as part of an overall reform 
of the pension system. The other motivation for this paper is the recent shift from 
guarantees to non-guarantees that Denmark went through.
Defined Benefits 
In abstract terms, a defined benefit plan (DB) defines the benefits to be received. 
In the Netherlands, future pension payments are promised upfront (in conditional 
terms, based on the life expectancies applied and the financial situation of the 
pension fund) and contributions are defined too, so that the result combines DB 
and DC characteristics. Nevertheless, it is officially categorized under the label of 
“DB”. In 2008, 88% of Dutch active employees had a DB plan and 5% a DC plan. The 
remaining 7% consisted of a mix of regulations and plans (Statistics Netherlands). 
Note that DB contracts in the Netherlands are de facto collective defined contribution 
5 Note that there is an exception for a small market in the Netherlands, bank savings with at 
least 20 year income are also entitled to tax beneficial rules. 
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(CDC) contracts. If a pension fund lacks capital (i.e. the assets of the fund are insuf-
ficient to meet the liabilities), then in a strict DB plan the employers bear the risk, 
meaning that they have to provide sufficient funding. However, in the Netherlands 
the contributions stay constant in such a situation and the pension payments are 
reduced according to a supervised recovery plan. This means that the risk is borne 
by the employees. The CDC plan thus combines the (conditional) guarantee of the 
pension payments with fixed contributions. This means that it has both DB and DC 
characteristics. If the contributions turn out to be insufficient, then the future pension 
rights linked to the premium will be decreased. Therefore, a purely DB plan does not 
describe the current Dutch system accurately, although the design and non-existence 
of hard guarantees only surfaced when several pension funds had to cut their benefits 
in April 2013 (Bovenberg et al. (2015)). The benefits are indexed or cut based on the 
funding ratio of the pension fund. The funding ratio is influenced by changes in life 
expectancies and interest rates. 
 Defined benefit schemes account for only about 5% of the Danish pension 
products.6 
Defined Contributions 
A defined contribution plan specifies how much money must go into a retirement 
plan today. The amount is typically defined as a percentage of an employee’s salary. 
The level to which pension wealth has accrued by the time of retirement depends 
on the combined premiums paid by the employee and employer and on the returns 
of the investment plan. At retirement, the wealth can either be allocated to a fixed 
annuity with guarantees or a variable annuity without guarantees. 
 In Denmark, the second pillar consists completely of DC schemes. At retirement, 
one can decide to take out a part of pension savings as a lump sum and use the 
remaining to finance a lifelong annuity, while in the Netherlands partial lump sums 
generate a heavy tax levy. DC products in Denmark have traditionally included an 
interest guarantee. These guarantees have gradually been decreased due to the low 
interest rates. This development serves as a motivation for investigating the transition 
from guarantees to non-guarantees. 
6 A DB pension scheme for civil servants in government differs from the occupational pension 
schemes in the second pillar in three central ways. First, it is enforced by legislation and thus 
statutory. Second, it is tax-financed through a PAYGO system. Finally, it is not negotiated 
through a collective agreement the way the occupational pensions are.  Therefore, these DB 
products are categorised as belonging to the first pillar instead of the second pillar. This means 
that there are no DB schemes in the second pillar in Denmark.
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 At retirement age, the accumulated pension wealth must be converted into an 
annuity. As such, there is conversion risk, meaning that, if interest rates are low at 
conversion, an annuity is relatively expensive. Thus, for a given pension wealth, the 
annual pension payments will be lower than when interest rates are high at conver-
sion. This is independent of whether one buys a fixed or a variable annuity.7 In the 
Netherlands, the AFM protects pension holders against conversion risk by imposing 
interest rate hedges.8 For bonds with long maturities, these will be high in value 
when interest rates are low and thus compensate the loss on the annuity, and vice 
versa.
 In Denmark, no significant distinction is made between pension funds and 
insurance companies. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, there is a distinction. 
In particular, since this paper discusses transitions within DC products, we focus on 
insurance companies as these are the main DC plan providers. The difference is that, 
when a pension fund cannot fulfil its obligations, the employer and employees bear 
the loss under a recovery plan. In an insurance company, the equity holders would 
have to pay extra since there no recovery plans are involved. However, equity holders 
have limited liability. Insurance companies are therefore required to hold large 
capital buffers rather than measure the funding ratio which determines indexation 
or decreasing pension payments in case of too low funding ratios. For lateral pension 
funds in Denmark, the pension holder is also the equity holder and thus shares the 
insurance characteristics more closely. For company pension funds, the company is 
legally liable, but these funds hardly exist in the Danish system. For more details and 
statistics on the macroeconomic dimensions of Dutch and Danish pension systems, 
see the appendix.
7 If one assumes that a low risk free rate implies a higher expected return, then the option to 
invest in equity can reduce conversion risk partially compared to a fixed annuity.
8 AFM is the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, similar to the Danish FSA.
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3. Variable annuities in the Netherlands
Since the recent financial crisis, the funding ratios of various Dutch pension funds 
dropped below 100% due to the low interest rates and the increasing life expectan-
cies. The combined effect of these phenomena is that pension payments cannot keep 
up with inflation. Moreover, regulation forces pension funds in a DB scheme, that are 
expected to remain underfunded for several years, to present a recovery plan. Such a 
plan can entail a cut in pension payments. These developments among many others 
have triggered a debate about the need for a revision of the pension system in the 
Netherlands. An important part of this debate centers on the move from guaranteed 
to non-guaranteed pensions. 
 The Social and Economic Council has analyzed several reforms.9 Variant IV-C, called 
“personal pension wealth with collective risk sharing”, gets much attention. In this 
variant the pension holder saves for his own pension within a collective pension 
fund, supplemented by a special buffer fund in which the different generations com-
pensate each other for intergenerational effects. In Variant IV-A, shocks are absorbed 
individually but micro longevity risk is shared. In Variant IV-B, investment risk can be 
shared as well but not across generations as in IV-C. 
 On a smaller scale, a new law for DC schemes, which has been in place since 
September 1, 2016, gives the possibility of turning accrued premiums into a variable 
instead of a fixed annuity. The Premium Schemes (Improvement) Act (“Wet Verbeterde 
Premieregeling” in Dutch, or WVP), serves as a pioneer in the movement towards 
a more flexible pension system. This Act is equivalent to Variant IV-A for the DB 
reform.10 Balter and Werker (2017) have analyzed the technical impact of the assumed 
interest rate and of smoothing financial shocks on expected pension payments.
3.1 Variable annuities
The WVP enables pensioners who have accrued pension rights in the second and third 
pillar to invest their pension wealth in a variable annuity. This gives them the option 
to keep investing in risky assets after retirement. Before the introduction of the WVP, 
it was compulsory to convert the pension wealth into a fixed annuity if the pensioner 
wanted to benefit from tax deductibility. The new option leads to uncertain pension 
payments. This explains the term variable annuity. Another choice that pension 
9 The Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER) advises the Dutch government and parliament on key 
points of social and economic policy. See https://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_
adviezen/2010_2019/2016/persoonlijk-pensioenvermogen.ashx 
10 Also a collective risk-sharing mechanism is possible in WVP, which is more like IV-B. 
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providers now have is that they can choose the assumed interest rate (AIR).11 The AIR 
determines the allocation of total pension wealth over future pension payments. Thus 
it divides the “pot” of money over the remaining lifetime of the retiree. This implies 
that pension providers can, for instance, offer an initially low expected pension in 
return for higher payments at a later age. 
 If financial shocks are absorbed immediately, pension payments will become 
volatile. This is undesirable since individuals prefer to smooth changes so as to keep a 
stable standard of living. Therefore, institutions can smooth shocks over several years. 
To ensure that the variable payments do not decrease too much, it is also possible to 
adjust the AIR such that it generates constant expected pension payments. The AIR 
becomes horizon-dependent in this case. Especially in collective systems, smoothing 
financial shocks can cause redistributions between generations. We do not discuss 
here, however, the issues of fairness that this raises; see Bonekamp et al., 2016a, for a 
discussion on this. 
 Other factors are regulated by the Dutch Central Bank, such as how pension funds 
and insurance companies deal with sharing longevity risk and smoothing financial 
shocks. The Authority for the Financial Markets focuses on communication. Pension 
product providers are obligated to share the micro longevity risk of the individual 
pension holder. Macro longevity risk can be transferred from the provider to the pen-
sion holder when the fixed annuity is changed into a variable annuity. Prior to the 
change in law, a fixed annuity was the only product that a retiree with a DC capital 
could purchase. Since the fixed annuity does not contain risk, the pension payments 
are known from the moment of retirement onwards, so that the macro longevity risk 
lies with the provider.
3.1.1 Illustrating pension accumulation in the Netherlands
Figure 1 depicts the expected pension payments for an individual who currently 
attains the pension age of 67. The calculations underlying the figure are based on the 
Black-Scholes/Merton model and are described in Balter and Werker (2017).
 The green dotted line in Figure 1 shows a pension holder’s monthly pension 
payment if he (or she) chooses a fixed annuity. His accumulated pension wealth has 
attained a certain value, with which he must buy a lifelong annuity. Since he buys 
a fixed annuity, he attains the risk-free rate so that future payments are known 
ahead. Note that, for simplicity, a fixed horizon is used. Macro longevity risk is borne 
11 In theory, pensioners can choose the AIR and the investment mix, although in practice the 
number of choices depends on the products available and thus on what the providers offer. In 
Section 3.2 we describe the options that pensioners can choose from. 
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by the provider, however, and thus the payments are fixed and will not change. 
Until September 2016, this was the only product available for pensioners within a DC 
scheme in the Netherlands. 
 Since that time it is permitted to include risky investments in the decumulation 
phase, so that individuals can choose between fixed and variable annuities. By 
investing part of the accrued pension wealth in risky assets, returns become uncer-
tain, and so do the pension payments as a consequence. Note that macro longevity 
risk can now cause fluctuations in pensions since providers are allowed to pass on 
investment risk and/or macro longevity risk. Based on a risk-return trade-off argu-
ment, the potential gain of the risky investment is the risk premium. Therefore, the 
expected pension payments are higher than the fixed payments since the latter do 
not include a premium on top of the risk-free rate. This is shown by the red dotted 
line. The red solid lines show the 95% confidence interval of the extra risk entailed by 
the risky investments.
 It is also possible to smooth financial shocks as described earlier. All other factors 
remaining equal, this option will lead to lower risk in the near future at the cost of 
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extra uncertainty later. This is depicted in Figure 1 by the blue lines.12 Less overall risk 
could compensate this at the cost of lower expected returns. Smoothing raises new 
issues in particular in the collective WVP or IV-B. For example, avoiding actuarial 
unfair participation in IV-B is technically non-trivial, see Bonekamp et al. (2016b).
All expected payments are constant in Figure 1. The AIR, which is the parameter that 
distributes the proportion of total wealth, determines the shape of the expectation. 
The WVP Act specifies the following rule: the maximum allowance on the assumed 
interest rate equals the proportion of wealth that is invested in risky assets multiplied 
by the risk premium, with a maximum of 35% of the risk premium. This rule ensures 
non-decreasing expected nominal pension payments. 
 In the next subsection, we discuss the products that have recently entered the 
market in response to the new legislation. 
3.2 Regulation and products 
The many options in product choice and design increase the complexity for pension 
scheme members. Variable annuities increase the nominal risk but potentially 
increase the expected return as well. Both pension providers and members have 
several choices, which are summarized below: 
Choice of the pension provider Choice of the participant
Flat or increasing expected payment stream Pension provider
Smoothing of shocks Fixed or variable annuity
Macro longevity Risk profile




Pension providers can choose the number of options to offer to members. The AIR 
together with investment mix determines the product. The higher the AIR, the 
larger the fraction of total pension payments that are paid out in the early phase of 
retirement (at the cost of relatively lower payouts later in retirement), the higher the 
level of risk, and the higher the potential return, and consequently the higher the 
expected pension payments. 
12 Figure 5 is based on the assumption that 35% of wealth is invested in risky assets. When 
smoothing, the percentage invested in risky assets is 46.5% to obtain the same expected pen-
sion with a smoothing period of five years as without smoothing. The expected risk premium is 
4%, and the volatility of the risky assets is 20%.
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 Overall, regulation states that the investment mix should match the risk appetite 
of the member. Dutch law also states that micro longevity risk is shared among pools 
of pension scheme members and thus borne by the provider. Variable annuities 
potentially move macro longevity risk from the provider to the member, leading to 
higher uncertainty about pension levels. The provider can choose whether the pro-
vider or the member bears the macro risk. 
 Hybrid structures are combinations of fixed and variable annuities. They provide 
a floor that reflects a minimum pension, contrary to the theoretical possibility of 
receiving no pension at all due to continuous rebalancing. Some providers facilitate 
these combinations, or they allow investing part of the pension wealth in the variable 
annuity products and the remainder in the fixed annuity. 
 Pension scheme members are asked both before and at the time of retirement 
which product they want to buy. A choice made at retirement is definitive. Before 
retirement, the option to change from a fixed to a variable annuity must take place at 
the time point when the lifecycle investment strategy aimed at a fixed annuity differs 
from the strategy that moves towards a variable annuity. The risk exposure depends 
on age, so if a retiree chooses a fixed annuity the exposure at retirement is zero, and 
a gradual decline in exposure deviates from gradual convergence to the exposure that 
is inherent to the variable contract.
 The pension provider may decide to include a partner pension in the variable 
annuity product. Consequently, the pension holder can choose this or not. If a person 
who has opted for this dies, the partner will receive variable or fixed payments 
depending on the agreement, although lowered by a predecided factor.  
 Participants are thus given the opportunity to choose between fixed payments 
from their retirement age onwards or to make use of the risk-return trade-off. Since 
the choice is presented before retirement, pension holders have several phases during 
which they can decide. However, the investment mix in the accumulation phase will 
be adapted to the desired investment mix in the decumulation phase. Therefore, a 
smooth transition is more likely when the decision is consistent. 
 Members moreover have a shopping right, meaning that if their current pension 
fund does not give both options, they may switch to another provider. Plus, one can 
always change insurance company. 
3.2.1 Examples of products with variable annuities in the Netherlands
Since September 1, 2016 several providers offer products with variable annuities. We 
summarize the main characteristics of these products in Table 2. 
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 The new product “Allianz Pensioen Doorbeleggen” is based on investing 31% of 
pension wealth in equities, with a gradual decrease to 0% over 20 years. Hence, if 
we assume a retirement age of 67, then no risk is taken anymore from the age of 87. 
Allianz also offers investment mix products consisting of a combination of a fixed and 
a variable annuity. These hybrid products provide a minimum guarantee, whereas 
strictly variable annuities can theoretically not pay out at all because of continuous 
rebalancing. They offer a guarantee in which 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% is 
invested in the fixed annuity and the rest in the variable annuity. Allianz does not 
inform the pension holder explicitly about the assumed interest rate, although there 
is the option to choose between “payments that are comparable with a guaranteed 
payment in the beginning and that can later increase based on the realized return” 
or “payments that are higher than a guaranteed payment in the beginning, while 
afterwards the realized return should ensure that the payments remain at the same 
level”. 
 Aegon invests 66% in risky assets and decreases this gradually, as described in 
the document accompanying its product “Aegon Uitkerend Beleggingspensioen”. It 
currently provides no option for a hybrid structure unless double fixed costs are paid. 
The rate applied to distribute the total wealth is set at 2.1%. 
 Nationale Nederlanden reduces the investment mix in the decumulation phase 
indirectly, by allocating each year 1/18th of pension wealth to a fixed annuity, leading 
to zero variability from the age of 85. Participants are insured against macro longevity 
risk in the product called “Variabel Pensioen”. This Nationale Nederlanden product is 
exposed for 35% to financial risk. 
 Delta Lloyd offers the same two options as Allianz under the name “Direct Ingaand 
Variabel Pensioen”. The initial high variant depends on the assumed interest rate. 
Depending on the risk profile, the proportion of the pension wealth invested in risky 
assets is 15% in the defensive profile, 30% in the neutral profile, and 45% in the 
offensive profile. After age 85, the investment risk is decreased in nine years to 0%. 
Moreover, these three options are all hybrid constructions since 85%, 70%, or 55% 
Table 2: Variable annuity products in the Netherlands











Allianz 31% Yes 20 years No No
Aegon 66% No Yes, little No No
Delta Lloyd 15%, 30%, 45% Yes 27 years Yes 5 years
Nationale Nederlanden 35% No Yes, till age 85 Yes No
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respectively of the total value at retirement is initially used to buy a fixed annuity, 
while the remainder is invested in the variable annuity with 100% in equities. In 
other words, there is no rebalancing effect in this set-up. Macro-longevity is insured 
and thus borne by the provider at Delta Lloyd only. All other providers transfer the risk 
to the members. In addition, Delta Lloyd smooths financial shocks over five years.
In their product descriptions, providers show the first pension payment and the 
expected pension payment at year ten after retirement in a good scenario and in a 
bad scenario. Allianz shows a graph in which all payments are visible. Balter and 
Werker (2017) show that the AIR has only a minor effect on the 10th expected pay-
ment, while a high AIR has a large downward effect on later pension payments, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1. The uniform set under which the different scenarios should 
be derived is still being developed by the Parameters Committee, which uses the 
stochastic scenario structure described in Koijen et al. (2010). Until then, a simplified 
temporary regulation about information provision related to the WVP applies.
 A puzzling observation is that the products yield decreasing expected pension 
payments over time. The AIR is capped at the lower of 35% and the investment mix of 
the risk premium. Hence, if one invests more than 35% in risky assets, the AIR will be 
less than the expected return, which leads to increasing expected pension payments. 
On the other hand, if one invests less than 35% in risky assets, then the AIR does 
not exceed the expected return. This technical rule has been discussed by the Dutch 
parliament and implemented to protect individuals against decreasing pensions. 
However, the expected pension payments offered by the providers described above 
show decreasing pensions. This is under current investigation by the AFM. 
 We also see that the individual pension holder cannot directly choose an AIR. 
Only in the case of Allianz and Delta Lloyd can individuals opt for two different 
payment streams, which link indirectly to the concept of the AIR. The investment 
mix cannot be chosen by the individual pension holder either, even in the case of 
Delta Lloyd, which investigates the risk profile and allocates a certain investment 
mix to the profile. Besides these insurance providers, there are also pension funds 
that offer variable annuities, e.g. Shell, Capgemini, and KPN. The Dutch financial 
press published some initial figures on the frequency of choice for variable annuities 
(Het Financieele Dagblad, 2017). Between 5% and 10% of the pension holders of 
Nationale-Nederlanden chooses variability, and this is expected to rise further. Before 
the summer of 2017, 10% of the DC holders of Aegon switched to the variable annuity; 
this increased to 25% after the summer of 2017.  
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4. Pension guarantees and non-guarantees in Denmark
4.1 Annuity pension in Denmark
Work-related pension schemes in Denmark are composed of different elements in 
terms of type of product, premiums, fees, asset allocation, pension benefits, and 
insurance cover, so the composition varies across pension funds. Besides life insur-
ance companies there are two types of pension funds with very similar legislation: 
company pension funds and occupational pension funds. The development of the 
number of Danish pension funds is shown in Figure 2.13
 Lateral pension funds are organized on the basis of sectors and type of work. They 
are non-profit organizations owned by both the employer organizations and the 
labor unions. This means that every decision, including decisions on investment, is 
the outcome of a collaborative process. The funds manage contributions, investments, 
and payouts. The activities of the funds are regulated by law. Pension assets may be 
used to cover actual pensions or insurance products linked to the pension scheme 
(disability pensions, spouse/children pensions). 
13 Twenty of these are private funds, cf. Section 2.










Life insurance companies Lateral pension funds Company pension funds
Source: Insurance and Pension (2017a)
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 The pension products can be divided into three general categories with different 
payout patterns, see Danish FSA (2017):
1.  Annuities (57%): lifelong pension payments. 
2.  Fixed period annuities (28%): payments ranging between 10 up to 25-30 years 
depending on the contract. Pension payments revert to the surviving relatives 
when the insured person dies.
3.  Age pension (15%): paid as a lump sum or in multiple installments.
Most lifelong annuities contain a variable element, which is explained in greater 
detail in Section 4.2. The last two schemes can be categorized as savings-based, 
whereas the annuity scheme is insurance-based, where until recently the longevity 
risk for the majority of contracts was shared between the members. In all three 
schemes, contributions plus the market return on investments determine the pension 
benefits that the pension holder is entitled to at retirement. Thus any interruptions of 
the work career due to maternity leave, sickness, and unemployment, as well as wage 
fluctuations, are reflected in the pension payments. Finally, contributions are tax 
deductible while payouts are taxed, similar to the Dutch system
 The focus of this paper is on lifelong annuity schemes, but within this category 
different pension savings products exist. Overall, a distinction is made between tradi-
tional participating contracts, so-called with-profits, and unit-linked contracts. There 
are also a number of contracts which can be regarded as a mix or extended version 
of the two, with “time pension”, a smoothed investment-linked annuity scheme, 
being the most popular. “Time pension” combines the principle of individuality and 
transparency regarding market returns from unit-linked products with the smoothing 
of returns from the traditional with-profit products, see Jørgensen and Linnemann 
(2012) and Jakobsen (2003).
 The majority of arrangements are set up as with-profit deferred annuity contracts. 
However, unit-linked products have become a growing part of the total market. 
Figure 3 shows unit-linked insurance premiums in relation to total gross premiums in 
Denmark.
 The majority of products have historically included a guaranteed annual return 
based on a minimum guaranteed interest rate. In pension schemes established before 
January 1996, the interest rate was usually between 3.7% and 4.5%; for schemes 
established between 1997 and July 2005, the interest rate varied between 2% and 3%. 
Since then, the guaranteed interest level has varied between 1.25% and 0.00%. The 
guaranteed average interest products ensure that the pension holder receives a mini-
mum annual return throughout the life of the contract, thus both in the accumulation 
the move towards riskier pension products 25
and the payout phase. This nominal guarantee was issued at the start of the contract. 
For instance, within the unit-link framework the guarantee can be regarded as a 
simple European put option. If the fund value at maturity (retirement) is less than 
the guaranteed payoff, then the put option is “in the money”, as seen from the point 
of view of the pension holder. Thus, if disappointing returns in the accumulation 
phase imply that the retirement account delivers less than the guaranteed level at 
retirement, then the pension fund is required to pay out the guaranteed amount. 
The potential unsustainability of these products in the long run helped trigger the 
Danish transition to non-guarantees. There has been a debate as to whether the 
annual guarantee should be understood as a minimum return every single year or as 
an average annual return during the accumulation phase. A court ruling by the Danish 
Supreme Court k in 2016 has made clear that these are guaranteed average annual 
minimum returns. In recent years, contracts have been issued with conditional guar-
antees, meaning that the pension fund will only be unable to honor the guarantee if 
certain events occur, e.g. if unexpected increases in life expectancy are observed.   
 For unit-linked contracts, the amount of pension savings is directly linked to the 
market value of the units that the individual pension holder’s portfolio is invested 
in. Pension holders can freely choose between units and can thus influence the risk 
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level of the investment profile. However, the interest rate guarantees imply incentives 
to increase the risk level of investments. Pension funds have imposed restrictions 
on investment rules for unit-linked contracts with guarantees in terms of the mix of 
financial assets and type of investment funds.
 The traditional participating with-profits contract is slightly more complicated 
and opaque as the typical profit-sharing contract can be decomposed into a risk-free 
bond element, a bonus option, and a surrender option, see Grosen and Jørgensen 
(2000, 2002). The majority of the contracts are issued without an option for the pen-
sion holder to sell back the policy at face value before maturity: this is the surrender 
option. The pension holder participates in an investment community together with 
the other pension holders and the owners of the pension fund. This joint portfolio 
ownership makes it challenging to identify which assets belong to the individual 
pension holder and thus the amount by which the individual pension account 
should be increased each year. The distribution of surplus between pension holders is 
required to be fair in the sense that the surplus should be redistributed to those who 
earned it. The individual pension fund determines the annual rate of interest on pen-
sion holder’s savings by applying a wide array of factors, such as actual investment 
returns, the size of the company’s free buffers and bonus reserves, the level of guar-
antees provided, the outlook, and the competition, see Jørgensen and Linnemann 
(2011). Part of the surplus is deposited into an “undistributed” reserve to smooth 
fluctuations in investment return over various calendar years. The pension fund is not 
allowed to grow “large” undistributed reserves as it could theoretically redistribute 
surplus from the past and present pension holders to future pension holders. The 
undistributed reserve is allocated to a buffer belonging to a group of pension holders 
with the same investment profile, and the size is determined according to the risk 
profile of the investments within that group. In these types of contracts the pension 
funds incur both investment risk and longevity risk. The distributed part is allocated 
to the pension holder as a percentage of the surplus according to the relative weight 
of the contributions. Thus the Dutch “DB” plan indexation works similar to the Danish 
with profit plans. 
 During the past ten years, most players in the pension industry have moved the 
annuity contracts specified as guaranteed average interest products to unguaranteed 
market return products. In the case of market return products without guarantees, the 
pension funds transfer the annual returns from the pension holder’s pension assets 
to the pension holder’s pension depot. Thus, in years of poor financial market perfor-
mance, pension payments will potentially be reduced accordingly. Moreover, increases 
in life expectancy will also imply benefit reductions in the payout phase. Thus, the 
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pension holder incurs both financial risk and longevity risk. However, the larger 
degree of freedom regarding investment strategy, combined with lower solvency cap-
ital requirements (as pension funds no longer have to honor interest rate guarantees) 
enables more risky investments and thus higher expected returns. On the investment 
side, market interest return products follow a lifecycle strategy. 
 Depending on the type of contract, the fund value (or guaranteed value) is con-
verted into either a fixed annuity or a variable annuity (after 2011). In theory, the fixed 
annuity can be variable if the pension holder has with-profit contracts as the annuity 
payments can be increased by bonus payments if actual investment performance 
exceeds the guaranteed return. A number of pension funds allow for flexibility in 
the payout phase. It is possible to receive higher pension benefits in the early years 
of retirement at the cost of lower pension benefits in later years, and vice versa. The 
rules regarding the regulation of the size of benefits vary significantly between funds. 
Finally, some providers combine market return products with a smoothing mecha-
nism in the payout phase, meaning that they withhold part of the pension holder’s 
pension assets at retirement. This buffer is used to smooth pension payments across 
time. However, if the market performs poorly for a longer period, it will be necessary 
to reduce pension payments accordingly.
 Conversion risk, as described in Section 2.2.1., also exists in Denmark. Since the 
pension providers decide on the exact investment strategies, they are responsible for 
addressing conversion risk. It is not clear that pension holders are made sufficiently 
aware of this mechanism.
4.2 From guaranteed to unguaranteed annuities
In May 2010, the sixth largest Danish pension fund, Sampension, decided, in coop-
eration with central labor market players behind the collective pension schemes, to 
discontinue the guaranteed benefits as from January 1, 2011. The fund argued that it 
was struggling to meet the new Solvency II rules, which would result in significantly 
stricter capital requirements applying to pension products with guaranteed benefits. 
Sampension manages pension schemes for Danish municipalities, the union of 
commercial and clerical employees (HK), Local Government Denmark, and other 
small groups. In total, it covers more than 300,000 pension holders.  At the time, 
Sampension offered three products: average rate (policies with profit sharing), 3 i 1 
Livspension (a lifecycle product), and Linkpension (unit-linked), with the majority of 
the products being profit-sharing. 
 The move of pension holders in Sampension from a guaranteed to an unguaran-
teed product inspired the majority of the Danish pension funds to introduce a similar 
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change for their pension holders. In some cases, the pension funds made a collective 
decision to transfer all pension holders to zero-interest guarantees, while other 
funds (Danica, PFA, JØP, and others) offered pension holders the option to decide for 
themselves whether they wanted to give up their interest guarantees. Moreover, it 
implied that the pension holders would now carry both financial and longevity risk 
as the pension benefits were made variable in the payout phase, based on market 
performance and life expectancy developments. Prior to these events in 2010 and 2011, 
there had been some cases where pension funds had invited their pension holders to 
relinquish their interest rate guarantees. In 2007, JØP made such an offer. 
4.2.1 Illustrating pension accumulation in Denmark
For illustration purposes, Figures 4 and 9 show how the guaranteed products (interest 
guarantee greater than zero) and unguaranteed products (interest guarantee equal 
to zero) for lifelong annuities in with-profit contracts differ in both the accumulation 
and the decumulation phase. The figures are constructed assuming two identical 
individuals who only differ in terms of whether their pension product is guaranteed 
or unguaranteed. 
 In Figure 4, we show how the pension wealth of the two individuals evolve during 
the accumulation phase.  
 The black line shows how both types of individuals’ pension wealth grow 
throughout their work life as they continue to pay contributions. The “guaranteed” 
individual accumulates higher expected pension wealth as shown by the red line. 
This is due to fact that a guaranteed average annual minimum return is added to 
that person’s account on top of the pension contributions. The uncertainty related 
to the “guaranteed” person’s account is depicted by the green dashed lines. If the 
pension fund performs well in the financial market, it has the option of distributing a 
bonus on top of the guarantee. The interest guarantee ensures that the policyholder’s 
accumulated pension wealth is bounded from below, as indicated by the dark green 
dashed line (overlapping with the red line: accumulated pension wealth plus the 
added guaranteed return). Thus the “guaranteed” individual only takes part in the 
upside, indicating that the value of the policy can only increase. 
 The “unguaranteed” individual, with a zero percent interest guarantee, is only 
guaranteed the value of his or her accumulated pension wealth. However, as the 
pension fund is able to invest in more risky products for this type of policyholder, a 
higher return is expected, as illustrated by the light-blue dashed line, higher even 
than the combined value of the interest guarantee and bonus distributions (based 
on realizations of the last five years). Due to the zero percent guarantee, a minimum 
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wealth equal to the nominal contributions forms the lower bound, as illustrated by 
the dark-blue dashed line. 
 In Figure 5, we show the expected pension payouts for the two types of individu-
als, who at retirement have accumulated an identical amount of pension wealth.
At retirement, total accumulated wealth is converted into an annuity, as indicated by 
the black line. The “guaranteed” individual can with certainty expect a higher pen-
sion payment than as reflected by the black line since the interest guarantee holds 
throughout the life of the annuity, thereby increasing the base amount from the black 
to the red line. Similar to the accumulation phase, the uncertainty regarding the size 
of the pension payouts in the decumulation phase only arises from potential bonus 
distributions (light-green dashed line) and is bounded from below by the positive 
interest guarantee (the dark-green dashed line). 
 The “unguaranteed” individual can on average expect higher returns due to 
more risky investments, as depicted by the purple line. The uncertainty regarding 
the expected payouts is greater, thus the upside from unguaranteed marked interest 
pension products is potentially higher (light-blue dashed line). The expected pension 
payments are bounded from below by the zero percent guarantee (blue dashed line), 
equivalent to the black line for the base amount of the converted annuity. However, 
Figure 4. Pension wealth during the accumulation phase.
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as the zero percent guarantee is a conditional guarantee, pension payouts can be 
reduced if the pension fund consistently performs poorly in the financial markets or 
if macro longevity increases more than initially anticipated (dark-blue dashed line). 
This makes the annuity variable in both upward and downward directions. 
 The Danish FSA has been heavily involved in the supervision of the discontinuation 
of interest guarantees. Many questions have been raised: did the pension holder 
receive sufficient information about the financial implications; how do you determine 
the value of the interest rate guarantee; to what extent should the pension holder’s 
individual account be increased when this guarantee is eliminated; how much of the 
undistributed bonus reserved for the participating contract with profit sharing was the 
pension holder entitled to, etc.?
 In 2014, the Danish Financial Business Act was amended, and in particular a §60a 
was added, containing guidelines on how to determine the financial value of pension 
holders’ accounts when giving up the interest rate guarantees. Moreover, it specified 
how much of the undistributed reserve should be allocated to each individual, how 
much the pension fund can charge regarding administration costs for transferring the 
policy holder, requirements regarding documentation to ensure that no redistribution 
Figure 5. Expected pension wealth during the decumulation phase.
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between policyholders takes place, and the amount that can be withheld by the pen-
sion fund as a buffer for unforeseen events. These guidelines might contain relevant 
inspiration for other countries, including the Netherlands, on how to regulate a shift 
from guaranteed to non-guaranteed products.
4.3 Evidence from a Danish mid-size pension fund
The Danish pension fund Juristernes og Økonomernes Pensionskasse (JØP) is intended 
for lawyers and economists. It is fully funded and owned by its more than 60,000 
members. The assets managed by JØP amounted to DKK 72.4 billion (app. USD 12 
billion) in 2016.  Until recently the fund only offered guaranteed average interest 
products, which ensured a minimum return for its pension holders as they were 
given an annual nominal guarantee at the start of the contract. The members have 
been offered different guarantees depending on their date of admission as displayed 
below. 
Date of Admission Level of Guarantee
Before January 1, 1990 3.70% or 4.25 %
January 1, 1990 – December 31, 1996 3,70%
January 1, 1997 – June 30, 1999 3,00%
July 1, 1999 – July 1, 2005 2,00%
From July 1, 2005 0,00%
Pension holders with a guaranteed interest rate above zero are grouped into a sep-
arate division within the pension fund, called Division 1. Over the past ten years, the 
fund has undergone a gradual transition from guaranteed to unguaranteed products. 
In the first election in May 2007, the 31,497 pension holders in Division 1 were offered 
the possibility of voluntarily giving up their interest guarantees, with the prospect of 
an investment strategy that enabled more risky investments and thus higher expected 
returns. This election thus involved an individual voluntary choice. Moreover, mem-
bers were informed that the expected capital requirements in Solvency II would most 
likely lead to lower future expected returns for individuals with a high guaranteed 
interest level. 
 To enable us to analyze individual characteristics that would affect the probability 
of pension holders giving up the guarantee, we were granted access to a cross-section 
of pension holders in Division 1 from October 2007. We obtained information about 
various personal characteristics as well as financial information. Table 3 contains 
descriptive statistics and reports the mean and the standard errors of the explanatory 
variables. The dependent variable Election_Outcome is a dummy variable that is 
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Table 3. Summary statistics: JØP’s members who change their pension product
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Election_Outcome 31.497 17,9% 38,3%
General
Male 31.497 56,2% 49,6%
Married 31.497 65,4% 47,6%
Retired 31.497 5,7% 23,2%
Age
Age_2029 31.497 3,7% 18,9%
Age_3039 31.497 38,4% 48,6%
Age_4049 31.497 27,5% 44,7%
Age_5059 31.497 18,1% 38,5%
Age_6069 31.497 8,3% 27,7%
Age_6669 31.497 2,0% 14,0%
Age_70100 31.497 2,0% 14,0%
Education
Economics 31.497 15,7% 36,4%
Political Science 31.497 19,3% 39,5%
Law 31.497 33,8% 47,3%
Business Economics 31.497 12,9% 33,5%
Education_Other 31.497 18,3% 38,6%
Region
Copenhagen 31.497 50,6% 50,0%
Greater Copenhagen 31.497 9,0% 28,6%
Zealand & Falster 31.497 8,5% 27,9%
Funen & Islands 31.497 4,0% 19,6%
South Jutland 31.497 3,5% 18,3%
West Jutland 31.497 3,0% 17,0%
Central Jutland 31.497 11,2% 31,6%
North Jutland 31.497 4,4% 20,6%
Region_Other 31.497 5,8% 23,5%
Level of Guarantee
InterestGua_2 31.497 31,9% 46,6%
InterestGua_3 31.497 11,8% 32,3%
InterestGua_3_7 31.497 25,8% 43,8%
InterestGua_4_25 31.497 30,5% 46,0%
Level of Pension Wealth
PensionWealth_VeryLow 31.497 16,4% 37,0%
PensionWealth_Low 31.497 32,1% 46,7%
PensionWealth_Medium 31.497 22,1% 41,5%
PensionWealth_High 31.497 21,2% 40,9%
PensionWealth_VeryHigh 31.497 8,1% 27,3%
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assigned a value of 1 if a pension holder in Division 1 voluntarily chose to opt out of 
the current interest rate guaranteed contract. 
 We see from Table 3 that 18% made this choice. The Male dummy variable for 
gender shows that more than half (56%) of the policy holders are male, which cor-
responds well with the higher workforce participation rate for men. The majority of 
pension holders are married (65%) according to the dummy variable Married, whereas 
only 6% of the pension holders are currently in retirement. Age is divided into seven 
age categories: age_2029, age_3039, age_4049, age_5059, age_6065, age_6669, and 
age_70100. The variable age_2029 takes the value 1 if the individual is between 20 
and 29 years old in 2007, and so forth. We clearly see that the pension fund is rela-
tively young as almost 70% of the pension holders are under the age of 50. 
 The level of education corresponds for almost all members to a university degree at 
bachelor’s level or higher. It is divided into five field categories: Economics, Political 
Science, Law, Business Economics, and Other. Approximately 29% of the pension 
holders hold a degree in Economics or Business Economics, 20% in Political Science, 
and 33% in Law. As to geographical location, we distinguish nine different regions 
in Denmark. These are Copenhagen, Greater Copenhagen, Zealand & Falster, Funen 
& Islands, South Jutland, West Jutland, Central Jutland, North Jutland, and Other 
Regions. Almost 60% of the members live in Copenhagen and Greater Copenhagen, 
11% in Central Jutland (including the second largest city, Aarhus), and the remaining 
30% are distributed around the country. In terms of interest rate guarantee, 30% 
of the members in Division 1 have the highest level of 4.25%, 26% have a 3.7% 
guarantee, 12% a 3% guarantee, and 32% a 2% guarantee. Thus, a significant part 
of the Division 1 members still had a high level of guarantees, even in 2007. Finally, 
we have information about the size of Pension Assets and the level of contributions. 
(Contributions are not displayed in the table nor included in the analysis as contribu-
tions and wealth are highly correlated.) Pension Wealth is divided into five categories 
based on the individual’s level of pension wealth. 
Level of Pension Wealth Values DKK
PensionWealth_VeryLow Less than 100,000
PensionWealth_Low Between 100,000 and 400,000
PensionWealth_Medium Between 400,001 and 800,000
PensionWealth_High Between 800,001 and 2,000,000
PensionWealth_VeryHigh Greater than 2,000,000
From Table 3, we see that almost 50% of the policy holders have pension wealth 
below DKK 400,000, whereas only 8% have pension wealth above DKK 2,000,000.
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Table 4. Results from Probit estimation
Number of obs 31.497
Pseudo R2 16,96%
dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z| 
General
Male 2,72% 0,41% 6,58 0,0%
Married -0,87% 0,43% -2,04 4,2%
Retired -11,35% 4,14% -2,74 0,0%
Age
Age_3039 -6,05% 0,91% -6,62 0,0%
Age_4049 -15,31% 1,02% -14,99 0,0%
Age_5059 -30,64% 1,33% -23,01 0,0%
Age_6069 -39,21% 2,26% -17,38 0,0%
Age_6669 -33,26% 4,07% -8,17 0,0%
Age_70100 -38,50% 7,82% -4,92 0,0%
Education
Political Science -1,40% 0,64% -2,19 2,9%
Law -4,85% 0,63% -7,74 0,0%
Business Economics -5,79% 0,72% -8,07 0,0%
Education_Other -4,75% 0,71% -6,7 0,0%
Region
Greater Copenhagen -1,73% 0,76% -2,29 2,2%
Zealand & Falster -3,34% 0,78% -4,26 0,0%
Funen & Islands -1,29% 1,06% -1,22 22,3%
South Jutland -3,29% 1,19% -2,76 0,6%
West Jutland -4,41% 1,25% -3,53 0,0%
Central Jutland 0,17% 0,65% 0,26 79,1%
North Jutland -3,80% 1,01% -3,75 0,0%
Region_Other -6,33% 0,92% -6,85 0,0%
Level of Guarantee
InterestGua_3 -5,49% 0,64% -8,61 0,0%
InterestGua_3_7 -8,13% 0,68% -11,91 0,0%
InterestGua_4_25 -12,40% 1,15% -10,82 0,0%
Level of Pension Wealth
PensionWealth_Low 6,27% 0,58% 10,85 0,0%
PensionWealth_Medium 8,35% 0,76% 11,05 0,0%
PensionWealth_High 6,28% 1,05% 5,99 0,0%
PensionWealth_VeryHigh 6,28% 2,19% 0,32 75,2%
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 Table 4 presents the results from the Probit estimation that explored the rela-
tionship between the election outcome and the set of independent variables listed 
above. The marginal effects and corresponding standard errors are displayed in Table 
4. All except three variables (PensionWealth_VeryHigh, Central Jutland, and Funen 
& Islands) are individually significant at a 5% level. Furthermore, we see from the 
likelihood-ratio test that they are also jointly significant. We see that men are slightly 
more likely to give up the interest rate guarantee (2.7%). Marital status has virtually 
no effect on the decision, whereas being retired decreases the probability of relin-
quishing the guarantee by 11.3%. Compared to being young (between the ages of 20 
and 29), the older a person is, the more likely such person is to remain in the current 
contract. Being above the age of 50 decreases the probability between 30-39%. We 
observe regional differences as pension holders in Copenhagen (reference group) 
are more likely to abolish their guarantee. We find strong significant effects that the 
higher the level of guarantee, the less likely a person is to give it up. Compared to a 
2% guarantee, an individual with a 4.25% guarantee is 12.4% less likely to relinquish 
it. Finally, higher pension wealth will decrease the probability of giving up the guar-
antee by 6-8%. All in all, these results indicate that men living in Copenhagen, with 
low guarantee level and pension wealth, were more likely to give up their guarantee.
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5. Lessons learned
Two main differences between the Danish and Dutch situations are that most Dutch 
private pension products in pillar two are DB whereas the Danish equivalent products 
are DC, plus the fact that Denmark started the transition towards more risky pension 
products some years ago whereas in the Netherlands s this transition has started only 
recently. This gives rise to some lessons from the Danish case that could be relevant 
for the Dutch case. First, the shifts in Denmark started before regulation was really 
in place. This means that a number of quite relevant questions were raised during 
the process where shifts took place. These include questions such as whether the 
information that pension holders received about the choices they should make was 
adequate, how to distribute undistributed reserves, how to price the interest rate 
guarantees that were given up when shifting from one product to another, how 
to take the risk of changes in life expectancy into account, etc. A clear lesson from 
the Danish case is that it would be wise to think more about how to regulate these 
transitions before they actually take place. It is only since 2014, after many customers 
had already shifted, that clear regulatory guidelines are in place in Denmark. Another 
lesson from the Danish case in this regard comes from a case study of shifts in a 
mid-size Danish pension fund. We found that men living in large cities, who have low 
pension savings and low guarantees, were more likely to switch. A third, more general 
lesson is that a pension system that is dominated by DC products can provide a good 
working system and deliver an adequate pension. After all, the Danish pension sys-
tem is ranked number one in the world. Thus the “fear of the unknown” (i.e., fear of 
DC products) in the Netherlands is not necessarily justified. 
 Denmark can, on the other hand, learn from the Netherlands how to inform 
pension holders about the risk they face. A good feature of the way Danish and Dutch 
pension projections are made is that all such projections are based on common 
assumptions about expected returns on different asset classes. In other words, pen-
sion providers cannot compete on what they individually estimate expected returns 
to be. A challenge with the way pension projections are presented in Denmark, on 
the other hand, is that they show only expected pensions, without. pension holders 
being told about the uncertainties surrounding pensions. In the Netherlands, pension 
holders are told, during their working life, about their first expected pension after 
they retire and ten years after, in both a good and a bad scenario (the 5% and 95% 
quantile), i.e. a low and a high bound on expected pensions. Given the shift from 
guaranteed to unguaranteed pensions in Denmark, this is obviously important for 
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pension holders to know. A process in this direction has only recently been initiated 
in Denmark.
 De Nederlandsche Bank, the Dutch central bank, is influential when it comes to 
pension regulation, including technical details. No such role exists for the Danish 
central bank. In Denmark, it is solely the FSA (which is equivalent to the Dutch AFM) 
that investigates the changes that take place in pension design, and it sets rules to 
protect pension holders and improve communication. A central bank can establish a 
framework that might be helpful in answering questions regarding design, feasibility, 
and fairness. Take, for example, the scenarios used to calculate the risk level of pen-
sion payouts. In the Netherlands, it is the central bank that provides these scenarios. 
In Denmark, it is the industry itself that does this. Another difference is that in the 
Netherlands it is the central bank and the government that guide a reform of the 
pension system. In Denmark, the market initiates the process. Concerning the overall 
reform that is still being discussed in the Netherlands, one could interpret the Danish 
example as a motivation to speed up the decision-making process and the legislation 
accompanying the new system, this in order to prevent running behind more or less 
opaque initiatives in the market. Having guidelines, rules, and regulations in place 
before transforming a system seems preferable to a setting where rules are introduced 
after the fact. 
 Reflecting on conversion risk – the risk that interest rates are low when accu-
mulated pension wealth is used to purchase an annuity – would lead to potential 
improvements for both countries. In Denmark the FSA can set protective hedging 
rules to mitigate the risk that annuities are expensive at the time of retirement due 
to low interest rates. In the Netherlands, opaque communication can be reduced by 
acknowledging that there is hardly any relation between conversion risk and variable 
annuities. 
 All in all, pension systems in Denmark and the Netherlands share many char-
acteristics and challenges. There are some significant differences as well, however. 
Regulators, pension providers, and pension holders can learn by studying the pension 
systems in the two countries and comparing them. This is what we have attempted to 
do in this paper.
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6. Conclusion
We have compared the Danish and Dutch pension systems and products. The focus 
of our paper has been on the shift from “safe” to “risky” pension products (for the 
customer) in both countries. These shifts occur because of the challenges that face 
pension systems worldwide, including in Denmark and the Netherlands, in particular 
in terms of low interest rates and increasing life expectancies. 
The main difference between the two systems is that the Danish pension market 
consists of almost exclusively of DC plans, whereas the majority of Dutch pension 
plans are DB schemes. This leads to our first observation that also a DC system can be 
effective and provide adequate pensions. Another lesson is the timing issue, which 
implies that it is wise to establish regulations before transitions take place. From 
the Danish case study that we have conducted, we found that men living in large 
cities, who have low pension savings and low guarantees, were more likely to give 
up the guarantee. Once the guarantees are given up, we recommend that pension 
holders should be informed not only about the potentially higher expected returns 
in the unguaranteed products but also about the associated increase in uncertainty. 
Given that the Dutch and Danish pensions system rank high on a worldwide scale, 
these findings should also be relevant for other countries than Denmark and the 
Netherlands.
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Appendix
Macro overview
Pension savings in the Netherlands and Denmark are quite substantial. According to 
the OECD (2015), Denmark is number one in the world in terms of private pension sav-
ings, measured in relation to GDP. Private pension savings in the Netherlands are the 
second highest. In 2015, private pension savings in Denmark amounted to approx-
imately two times Danish GDP, while private pension savings in the Netherlands 
amounted to approximately 180 percent of Dutch GDP, see Figure 6.
 In 2015, total pension savings in the Netherlands amounted to USD 1,317 billion 
and in Denmark to USD 600 billion. Not surprisingly, the country with the nominally 
highest pension savings is the US, but the country with the sixth largest amount is the 
Netherlands, with Denmark right behind as eighth largest (see Figure 7). 
The typical size of a pension fund differs considerably between the Netherlands and 
Denmark. In the Netherlands, there are 319 private pension funds. In Denmark, there 
are only 20. This means that the average Dutch pension fund manages assets worth 
USD 4 billion, whereas the average Danish pension fund manages USD 30 billion.
Life expectancy is likely to increase in the Netherlands and Denmark, as in most OECD 
countries. In 2010, a 65-year old man could expect to live for 17.6 more years in the 
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Netherlands (OECD, 2015), which is slightly above the OECD average of 17.5 years. Life 
expectancy at 65 in Denmark was slightly lower at 17 years. In 2060, life expectancy is 
expected to increase to 22 years, 21.9 years, and 21.4 years for the Netherlands, OECD, 
and Denmark respectively (see Figure 8).
 The increase in life expectancy, coupled with a fertility rate that is expected to 
remain below 2 in both Denmark and the Netherlands, implies that old-age depen-
dency ratios will increase. In Denmark, in 2015, there were 32 individuals above the 
age of 65 per 100 individuals in the working age, defined as those aged between 
20 and 64. In the Netherlands, the corresponding number was 30.5.  The old-age 
dependency ratio is increasing relatively fast in the Netherlands, although not much 
out of line with the rest of the OECD. These numbers are expected to increase to 47.6 
for Denmark and 55.9 in the Netherlands (see Figure 9). 
 Impacted considerably by the expected increase in life expectancy and the 
consequences that this will have for developments in old-age dependency ratios, 
the legal retirement age will increase in both the Netherlands and Denmark. In the 
Netherlands, the retirement age will increase to 66 years in 2018 and to 67 years in 
2021. In 2022, the retirement age will be set at 67 years and 3 months. From 2022 
Figure 9. Old-age dependency ratios.
Number of individuals aged 65 and over per 100 working age individuals,  
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onwards, the retirement age will depend on the development in average life expec-
tancy. An increase in the retirement age is announced at least five years in advance. 
Statistics Netherlands calculates the life expectancy of the Dutch. The goal is that 
retirees should receive a pension for an average of 18 years. Note that the retirement 
age discussed here applies for the first pillar pension, which is decoupled from the 
other pillars that apply a retirement age of 68 in 2018. In Denmark, the retirement 
age will increases to 67 years in 2022 (from 65 years today). The retirement age will 
then follow the life expectancy developments, as in the Netherlands. In Denmark, 
the aim is that the average expected retirement period should be 14.5 years. The 
retirement age can be adjusted every fifth year (depending on the development in life 
expectancy). In 2015, it was decided that the retirement age will be 68 years in 2030. 
It is expected that the retirement age will be increased by one year every fifth year 
from 2035 to 2050 (Danish Ministry of Finance, 2017). This means, for instance, that the 
expected retirement age will be 72 years in 2050. Based on the Dutch life expectancies 
of 2017, this would mean a retirement age of 70 years and 3 months in 2050 in the 
Netherlands. 
 What does the high current pension savings level, along with increasing life 
expectancy, imply for replacement ratios? The replacement ratio is the ratio between 
gross income after retirement (including the first and second pillars, see below) 
and gross income before retirement. The replacement ratio is relatively high in the 
Netherlands and Denmark compared to other OECD countries. It is about 91% and 71% 
for the Netherlands and Denmark respectively, while the European average ratio is 
about 54% (OECD, 2015). The OECD overestimates the Dutch rate since the underlying 
assumption is that a fictitious person receives the median income throughout his or 
her working life of 45 years (Knoef et al., 2015). However, pension income is in reality 
likely to be lower for many due to an incomplete working history. Traditionally, the 
ambition was to have a pension income of about 70% of the last earned gross wage, 
but this was changed to 70% of the average earned salary over those years that con-
tributions were paid to the Dutch DB plans. In Denmark, there is no official goal of a 
fixed replacement ratio.
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